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1 Introduction
The literature on the cross-country convergence of incomes is full of contro-
versies and puzzles, but recently it has been suggested that the demographic
transition may explain many conflicting observations (Galor 2007). The main
argument is that differences in the timing of the demographic transition have
segmented countries to the different regimes and simultaneous existence of
these regimes makes the observations difficult to understand if their demo-
graphic background is not properly understood.
Demographics can increase our understanding in two ways. It is well
known that convergence fails in heterogenous samples of countries. Hence, it
has been suggested earlier that countries should be classified into homogenous
clubs according to common history (Baumol 1986), geographical location
(Maddison 1994), mutual trade (Ben-David and Loewy 1998), or produc-
tivity thresholds (Azariadis and Drazen 1990). Given that in the post-war
period countries were in different stages of their demographic transitions,
classifying according to these stages should generate homogenous clubs. The
underlying tendency for convergence should then manifest itself within these
clubs. On the other hand, the demographic transition can also increase our
understanding about the convergence in the future. Because this transition
is a dynamic process which is far from completed everywhere, many coun-
tries will move ahead toward more mature stages. Therefore, an important
question is whether these movements imply the more equal distribution of
world incomes, i.e., is the convergence in the future stronger than in the past.
In the demographic transition, considerable changes in all demographic
variables take place, but different authors emphasize different factors. Soares
(2007), for example, maintains that infant mortality has the leading role:
once it starts to fall fertility follows and the transition proceeds according
to its internal laws. On the other hand, Ram (1998), Fogel (1994, 2004),
Becker et al. (2005), and Lorenzen et al. (2008) claim that life length-
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ening is decisive as short-sighted and deterministic attitudes give way to
optimistic views, whereas Bloom and Williamson (1998) stress the practical
role of the dependence rate. In the “Unified Growth Theory”, Galor and
Weil (2000) emphasize the interplay between population growth and tech-
nical change. The number of demographic clubs has been disputed as well.
Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that this number should be limited to
two, whereas Galor and Weil (2000) advocate three clubs, the “Malthusian”,
”Post Malthusian” and “Modern”. Chesnais (1992), in turn, claims that the
correct number of the demographic stages is six.
To collect, in order to evaluate the role of the demographic transition
in the convergence of incomes, one has to evaluate whether demographic
clubs exist in the data, what is their number, and which demographic factors
best discriminate between the clubs. The next question concerns economic
convergence within the clubs and, finally, one has to evaluate, what the
observations can tell about the future.
To answer these question, we discover the number and boundaries of the
clubs by the regression tree method suggested by Breiman et al. (1984)
and Durlauf and Johnson (1995). The main advantage is that this method
chooses the variables and factors which most efficiently classify the data, thus
providing important information about the clubs.
We apply various convergence tests to the clubs. The interest on growth
and convergence has been extensive recently and a number of papers evaluate
the topic from different perspectives. Li and Papell (1999) maintain that the
failure to find convergence is due to structural changes, finding evidence for
convergence if breaks are allowed. Their results are confirmed by Strazicich
et al. (2004) for the OECD countries and by Cunado and Perez de Garcia
(2006) for 43 African countries. Authors, such as Pedroni (2007) and Li
and Papell (1999) find, however, that even within the OECD, there is only
a sub-set of countries that is prone to convergence. While Pesaran (2007c)
finds evidence for pair-wise convergence across the Middle East, North Africa
2
and the Rest of the World, his findings, however, indicate that in a panel of
countries one can rarely expect to find a convergence as a significant fraction
of each sub-set fails to converge to the output mean. Hineline (2008) also
highlights the merits of clustering the data when different countries obey
different laws of motion.
While the shortcomings of the cross-sectional test have been known, our
results highlight the potential problems in the first generation unit root tests
when the data exhibits cross-section dependence, undermining the reliability
of these tests. In the context of output convergence, this means that conver-
gence may be found where it does not exist. We provide new evidence on
the presence of cross-section dependence and show the variation of the con-
vergence tests by different techniques from strong evidence in the traditional
β-convergence tests to the failure to reject the null by the second generation
unit root tests. Thus, our results are best in line with the critical findings of
Pedroni (2007), Li and Papell (1999), and Pesaran (2007c). To understand
the implications of the demographic transition we evaluate its progress in the
future, predicting take-offs even among the poorest countries. These take-
offs, however, will be insufficient for rising their incomes to meet the income
of the rich, implying bi-polarization in the future.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the data and meth-
ods, Section 3 generates the clubs, Section 4 provides the convergence tests,
and Section 5 discusses the future growth prospects. Section 6 discusses the
merits of the findings.
2 Data and Methods
To investigate the role of demographics in the convergence of countries, we
collect data for incomes and demographic variables. There are several can-
didates for demographic threshold variables but we choose the total fertility
rate, dependence rate, life expectancy, and infant mortality rate since their
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role is frequently discussed in the literature. Thus the variables are
yt = log of real per capita GDP (international
dollars, base year 2000).
GROWTH = annual average growth rate of real per capita GDP
defined by (yt0+T − yt0 ) /T .
TFR = Total fertility rate (children per woman).
DEP = Dependency rate (ratio of population aged
0-14 and 65+ per 100 population 15-64).
LIF = Life expectancy (at birth, both sexes).
IMR = Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 live births).
To keep the threshold variables exogenous, they are measured at the begin-
ning of the research period which extends from 1960 to 2003. Data for these
variables is available for 85 countries. The countries that have experienced
extreme economic or social changes are excluded.1 The demographic data
come from the United Nations (2007) and the economic data from Heston et
al. (2006).
To see whether multiple regimes should be taken seriously we make data
splits according to the mean of each demographic threshold variable in coun-
try i (xi), and test whether GROWTH is identical in the sub-samples by
estimating
(yi,t0+T − yi,t0 ) /T = ϕ+ λxi + ²i. (1)
The Wald-test for the similarity of the coefficients ϕ and λ in the sub-samples
yields a highly significant F−statistics for three of the four splits. Thus, we
reject the similarity in favor of the sub-samples.
Even though the specification test suggests that some demographic clubs
exist in the data, their number and boundaries are not properly revealed
1The excluded countries are the highest AIDS prevalence countries (Lesotho, South-
Africa and Zimbabwe), the oil countries (OPEC members), and the East-European coun-
tries. We also exclude Rwanda and China because of the mass murders in the former and
the population policy in the latter. The demographic data for Taiwan is replaced by that
of South Korea which has a quite similar demographic history. The need to keep Taiwan
arises because of the scarcity of countries with remarkable slow-downs in fertility.
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by mechanical splits. Hence, clubs are discovered by using the regression
tree analysis, suggested by Durlauf and Johnson (1995).2 Regression tree
analysis is a data-sorting method that splits the range of the regressors to
find the best piecewise linear model. Its algorithm chooses both the splitting
variable and the split value to generate the largest possible decreases in the
residual deviance. Only one-step look ahead and binary splits are used.
Successive splits grow up a tree, starting from the root (the full sample) to
the leaves (clubs). To choose the best number of the clubs, several criteria are
available. The cross-validation method, for example, can be used to control
for the potential over-fitting. In our case, however, one faces the limits of the
convergence tests, implying that clubs should not be too small, so that we
apply the pre-determined club-size criteria of ten members here. A detailed
description of the regression tree method is available in Breiman et al. (1980)
and Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
Another important question is whether the generated clubs exhibit the
convergence of incomes. In this paper, we apply several types of tests to
compare our results with previous studies.
A cross-section of countries is said to exhibit unconditional β−convergence
if the estimated β in the model
Model 1: (yi,t0+T − yi,t0 ) /T = α + βyi,t0 + εi,t
is negative, indicating that economic growth in the poorer countries is faster
than in the richer (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Evans (1998) first applied
the unit root tests for the stationarity of output differences. Thia propwery
can be tested by using three nested specifications from general to specific:
2Hansen (2000) develops an asymptotic distribution theory for threshold coefficients
and calculates their confidence limits while Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2007) apply Markov
transition matrices to uncover non-linearities in the data.
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Model 2 : ∆ (yi,t − y¯t) = αi + θit+ ρi (yi,t−1 − y¯t−1) + (ui,t − u¯t) ,
Model 3 : ∆ (yi,t − y¯t) = αi + ρi (yi,t−1 − y¯t−1) + (ui,t − u¯t) ,
Model 4 : ∆ (yi,t − y¯t) = ρi (yi,t−1 − y¯t−1) + (ui,t − u¯t) ,
where y¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 yi,t and ui,t is iid. Models 2 and 3 include a country-
specific constant αi, necessary if some slowly-changing factor wedges the
incomes from the mean. Model 2 also includes a country-specific trend θit,
adressing time-related factors, such as the diffusion of technology, which may
take place at different pace in different countries (Lee et al. 1997). It is often
necessary to allow this kind of heterogeneity even within the clubs since a
complete control of heterogeneity by clustering may not be possible. Only
the test with no intercept and trend (Model 4 ) always refers to decreasing
income gaps, i.e., to unconditional convergence, whereas Models 2 and 3
refer to the conditional one. For discussion see Pesaran (2007b) and Pedroni
(2007).
In Models 2-4, country i converges to the mean (has a stationary time
series of income differences) if the estimate for ρi is negative, but several
test variants exist in terms of similarity of this estimate across countries.
Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) assume convergence at a common rate,
i.e., ρi = ρ for all i. Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) propose a test
statistics which builds on Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. This test,
as well as the Fisher inverse square test by Maddala and Wu (M&W, 1999)
and the inverse normal test by Choi (2001) all assume individual unit root
processes, indicating that countries may convergence at different rates and
some countries may not converge at all. For the convergence of the sample
it is then enough to show that ρ¯ < 0. The difference between LLC and the
other tests is that LLC pooles the data while the other tests pool the test
statistics, hence different assumptions about ρi.
Recently, Pesaran (2007a) has criticized the use of the so called first
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generation panel unit root tests above because they do not account for cross-
section dependence, arising across countries due to spatial and spill over
effects or due to unobserved common factors (Baltagi and Pesaran 2007).
Although IPS and Choi both allow for a limited amount of cross-correlation
due to demeaning in the presence of common time effects (common business
cycles, for example), demeaning does not help if reaction to shocks differs
across countries.3 Pesaran (2007a) investigates the properties of the IPS,
M&W, and Choi tests in the presence of cross-sectional dependence by Monte
Carlo simulations. With low dependence, IPS and Choi perform reasonably
well, whereas M&W begins to work when T increases. With high cross-
section dependence, all tests tend to over-reject the null.
There are methods for correcting the bias from cross-section dependence.
Pesaran (2007a), for example, proposes a panel unit root test to modify IPS
in the presence of a single unobserved common factor but this does not come
without costs: if no dependence exists the corrected IPS (CIPS) performs
worse than the original test.4 While the CIPS test rarely over-rejects the
null, its power is often relatively low, i.e., if the null hypothesis is false the
test may fail to reject it. The second pitfall is that since Pesaran’s test builds
on IPS, the unconditional convergence in Model 4 can not be tested with it.
There are several techniques to discover the cross-sectional dependency
on the data.5 The CD-test proposed by Pesaran (2007a) calculates
3The essential difference here is that assume ui,t=λjft + εi,t.If λ¯j = λ for all j then
demeaning as suggested in Models 2 to 4 is enough to whiten the error term, otherwise
we need to resort to second generation unit root tests.
4The development in this field is rapid. Pedroni (2007) utilices B-trace and J-trace
tests, to check the robustness of unit root test results in the presence of cross-section
dependecy. To our knowledge, these tests are, however, not available for the users of
Stata.
5The development in this field is rapid. For instance, Pesaran et al. (2007) proposed
the use of a bias-adjusted LM test. They show that this test is more robust than the other
two. The problem with the adjusted LM test is that it assumes strong exogeneity, which
does not hold in our data.
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CD =
√
2T
N (N − 1)
(
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
γˆij
)
, (2)
where T and N are the number of observations in time and cross-sections,
and γˆij is the residual correlation between countries i and j, these residuals
being obtained from individual ADF(p) regression, similar to Models 2-4
augmented with the lags of order p. The statistics of this easy-to-apply test
is normally distributed with N (0, 1), but the drawback is that it lacks power
if the population average pair-wise correlation is (close to) zero. Another
relatively simple test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980)
LM = T
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
γˆ2ij (3)
is based on χ2N(N−1)/2 distribution. While this test is not affected by the zero
averages, it is likely to exhibit substantial size distortions when N is large
and T is small.
3 Demographic Clubs
Figure 1 reports the results of the regression tree analysis. The algorithm
chooses the first split in terms of life expectancy, the split value being LIF =
48.01. Countries with LIFi < 48.01 constitute the first club (35 countries).
The algorithm then suggests the second split in terms of the dependence
rate with the split value DEP = 94.94 but, unfortunately, the number of
the members in the club with DEPi ≥ 94.94 is too low (eight countries),
thus violating the pre-determined minimum size for the clubs. To be able
to continue the partition further we exclude the dependence rate from the
threshold candidates. The algorithm then makes the next split in terms of
the life expectancy again, the split value being LIF = 55.785, thus parti-
tioning the rest of the sample into the sub-samples of 12 and 38 countries
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(LIFi < 55.785 and LIFi ≥ 55.785). The next split again violated the club-
size requirement. Hence, the (maximum) number of clubs is three. Most
developing countries are allocated into Club I, the East-Asian Tigers into
Club II, and the Western countries into Club III. A complete list of countries
and clubs with demographic and economic statistics is given in Appendix A.
  Split
Variable
Split Value
  Club
Number
 Number of Countries
    Average Growth
    Stage of Growth
II III
    I
LIF
LIF
48.01 
55.785
     35
  0.74 %







           38
         2.49%
  	 
  
          12
         3.21 %


Figure 1: The regression tree. The left arrow indicates the observations
for which the split variable < Split Value. The right arrow indicates the
observations for which the split variable ≥ Split Value.
The order by which the threshold variables enter to partition the data
refers to their importance in terms of the dependent variable. In our case,
the importance of the life expectancy is emphasized. Three types of intu-
itive explanations arise. The first relies on the close connection between
life-time health and life expectancy, stressing the role of physical capacity of
humans as workers (Fogel 1994, 2004) whereas the second highlights the men-
tal change associated with the lengthening of life, and the interaction between
short-term costs and long-term benefits in actions like saving and educational
investments (Ram 1998, Weil 2007, Lorentzen et al. 2008). Those who die
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young will fail to take such actions, while longer life encourages them. Fur-
thermore, the premature deaths of adults also totals a considerable human
capital loss. According to the third explanation, the diffusion of production
and health technologies go hand in hand and the life expectancy may be a
measurable indicator of both (Soares 2007).
The life-expectancy differentials should also explain the growth differen-
tials between the clubs. To the extent that life expectancy refers to the
productivity of workers, the slow economic growth in the low-life-expectancy
club (Club I) and the rapid economic growth in the high-life-expectancy club
(Club III) is natural, but this does not explain why the growth is the highest
in the medium-life-expectancy club (Club II). If life expectancy is, however,
understood as an indicator for technical diffusion, the efficiency of which
depends both on the gap to the leaders and on the ability to adopt knew
knowledge, then one can see that these both only hold in Club II, while Club
I, in spite of its large gap, fails sufficient human capital for the adoption of
technology.
The number of the demographic clubs is tree, being identical with that
suggested by Galor and Weil (2000). As the discussion above suggests, their
driving variables, human capital and technical change, may not be so dif-
ferent from our life expectancy. Furthermore, the increasing life-expectancy
status from Club I to Club III seems to give support to the interpretation of
our clubs as successive demographic stages, denoted as “Malthusian”, “Post
Malthusian” and “Modern” by Galor and Weil (2000). Fiaschi and Lavezzi
(2007) also find three clubs out of 122 countries although based on initial in-
comes. The number of the literacy and income-based regimes (96 countries)
in Durlauf and Johnson (1995) is four, their club 1 being a sub-set of our
Club I, while their club 4 is a sub-set of our Club III. Their intermediate
clubs consist of countries from all of our clubs.
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4 Convergence Within the Clubs
4.1 Unconditional β−Convergence
In this section we concentrate on the convergence of incomes within de-
mographic clubs, starting from the unconditional β-convergence defined in
Model 1. Table 1 shows that the estimated β in the full sample is positive
and significant, i.e., the sample diverges. By contrast, β is negative in clubs
although significant at the 5 % level only in Clubs I and III. Convergence in
samples similar to Club III has been shown in earlier studies but the now-
shown β-convergence in Club I is a new result. The estimated β in Club II is
large but significant only at the 8 % level. A closer examination shows that
its members have changed their relative positions and the correlation of rank
orders in 1960 and 2003 is −0.06, i.e., there is “leapfrogging” in this club.
This possibility was discussed by Sala-i-Martin (1996) and is now exemplified
in Club II.
club Model 1
β t-test prob.
Full sample 0.354 2.212 0.015
Club I -0.640 -2.339 0.013
Club II -1.912 -1.511 0.081
Club III -0.479 -1.836 0.037
Table 1: The results for Model 1
4.2 Cross-Section Dependence and Unit Root Tests
To evaluate the presence of cross-sectional dependence, we ran the ADF(p)
regressions with the individual values of p to compute the pair-wise cross-
section correlations for the residuals (Pesaran 2007a). Table 2 shows that
the average correlations are -0.021, -0.061, and -0.01 for Clubs I − III, re-
spectively.6 The CD statistics for Clubs I − III are -3.33, -3.31, and -1.85.
6Since we are testing the convergence hypothesis, we ran the ADF(p) regressions for
the demeaned data. If the cross-section dependence is still present, it is off more complex
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Club I Club II Club III
N 35 12 38
γ¯ij -0.021 -0.061 -0.011
CD -3.333 -3.307 -1.852
LM 641.7 105.3 1181.0
df 595 66 703
Table 2: Descriptive statistics from Clubs I– III.
The first two values are highly significant, while the value for the third club
is not significant at 5 % level (CD< |1.96|). Even though the CD test is ad-
versely affected by zero means, it indicates strong cross-section dependence
in Clubs I and II. Moreover, since the power of this test is low when the
average correlations tend to zero as in Club III, it may be the case that Club
III is prone to cross-section dependence as well. The LM test statistics are
also high and significant although Clubs I and III are probably too large to
yield reliable results. Hence, there is at least some cross-section dependence
on the data, thus rendering the use of second generation tests.
Table 3 summarizes the first generation unit root tests for Model 2, show-
ing that no convergence exists in the full sample.7 The tests also accept the
null of no convergence for Clubs II and III, while the LLC and M&W tests
offer weak support for convergence in Club I. The second generation test (Pe-
saran’s CIPS), on the other hand, gives the test statistics of -2.016, -1.760,
and -1.607 for the clubs, and -1.926 for the full sample, respectively. Given
that the critical values for Pesaran’s CIPS, with T=44 and 12 < N < 85
and 5%-level of significance, are all around -2.61, the null of non-stationarity
cannot be rejected for any of the clubs.8 The power of the CIPS test is
relatively low in the presence of trends, so that the rejection of the conver-
form than expected by the first generation tests so that they are biased.
7All first generation tests were performed by Eviews and cross-checked with Stata.
We allowed automatic selection of lags based on Scwartz Information Criteria and when
kernels had to be used, we used Newey-West bandwidth selection by Bartlett. The second
generation test is only available in Stata; individual lags were allowed here.
8The critical values of CIPS-test are tabulated by Pesaran (2007a) Tables II(a)-II(c).
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Club I Club II Club III Full sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -2.010 0.022 0.513 0.696 0.615 0.731 -0.277 0.391
IPS -0.538 0.295 -0.408 0.342 1.839 0.967 0.127 0.551
M&W 89.57 0.058 26.84 0.312 58.72 0.929 188.42 0.159
Choi 86.67 0.086 26.11 0.348 46.72 0.997 158.82 0.720
Table 3: Results for Model 2.
Club I Club II Club III Full Sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -0.110 0.456 -0.445 0.328 -3.619 0.000 -2.735 0.003
IPS 0.380 0.648 2.381 0.991 -0.373 0.355 2.522 0.994
M&W 79.58 0.203 15.58 0.900 100.35 0.032 180.49 0.277
Choi 86.80 0.085 15.32 0.911 92.76 0.093 202.87 0.043
Table 4: Results for Model 3.
gence is somewhat expected. This rejection, however, is supported by the
conventional IPS and the Choi tests, the tests that are likely to be robust in
the presence of moderate cross-section dependence. Moreover, as they tend
to over-reject the null in this case, the fact that they don’t, strengthens the
finding.
Table 4 reports the results with intercept but without trend (Model 3 ).
The first generation unit root tests (with the exception of IPS) now suggest
that Club III exhibits convergence. LLC and Choi also suggest convergence
for the data as a whole. The CIPS test statistics for clubs and the full
sample are -1.369, -0.726, -1.323, and -1.186. As the critical value of CIPS
test for the 5% level is around -2.11 for all sample sizes here, the CIPS test
rejects convergence in each case. Hence, the tests that are most robust in
the presence of cross-section dependence fail to support convergence again.
Table 5 presents the first generation test results for unconditional con-
vergence (Model 4 ) providing a result which replicates the common finding
that the rich countries exhibit convergence while convergence is not found in
other clubs. Unfortunately, this test cannot be performed by IPS so that no
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Club I Club II Club III Full Sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -0.795 0.213 1.440 0.925 -1.633 0.051 7.264 1.000
IPS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
M&W 70.47 0.462 26.27 0.340 114.21 0.003 112.40 1.000
Choi 70.35 0.468 26.43 0.332 107.52 0.010 107.44 1.000
Table 5: Results for Model 4.
second generation test is available yet.
To summarize, we find unconditional β-convergence (Model 1 ) in all clubs,
indicating that the regression tree analysis has succeeded in uncovering three
traditional convergence clubs on the demographic basis alone. Those first
generation unit root tests which provide opportunities to control for the
heterogeneity within the clubs (Models 2 and 3 ) also support conditional
convergence in Club I but none in Club II. The tests, however, are likely to
be biased by the cross-section dependency and the more robust second gener-
ation tests do not find conditional convergence in these clubs. Furthermore,
no unconditional convergence (Model 4 ) can be found by the first generation
tests for these clubs. Maybe the most interesting is Club III as countries move
ahead in the demographic transition and ultimately enter this club. Here, the
first generation tests give some support to conditional convergence (Model
3 ), this result being undermined by the second generation test again. On the
other hand, the support for unconditional convergence is strong (Model 4 )
from the first generation tests. Unfortunately, unavailability of the second
generation test for Model 4 leaves many questions open as the cross-section
dependency is indicated also in this club.
How do we now conclude with the argument that convergence, if it ex-
ists, should manifest itself in homogenous clubs? From the technical point of
view, our findings are in line with the development of the literature, running
from the earlier findings of no β-convergence in broad samples but some in
clubs (Baumol 1986, Mankiw et al. 1992, Maddison 1994, Ben-David and
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Loewy 1998) to the markedly skeptical findings from the recent second gen-
eration unit root tests (Li and Papell 1999, Pedroni 2007, Pesaran 2007c),
indicating that the quest of convergence is far from settled.9 On the other
hand, a demographic explanation for the mixed evidence can also be found
since the demographic transition is a continuous rather than discrete process,
necessarily leaving some timing-heterogeneity into the clubs. Furthermore,
Chesnais (1992) has emphasized that the phase of the demographic transition
differs across countries as some proceed much faster than others. Therefore,
by controlling for the initial state alone, we may have failed to control for
the differences in this phase. The heterogeneity, measured by the standard
deviation of the life expectancy, actually increased from 1960 to 2003 within
the first two clubs. Furthermore, life-expectancy leapfrogging was typical
of Club II, i.e., the rank orders of some countries decreased (Thailand) or
increased (Syria) to a great extent, thus explaining the less promising con-
vergence results in this club. Hence, a control for the heterogeneity from the
different phases of the demographic transition is a necessary future task al-
though this task is challenging, as some of these differences may be dictated
by economic growth itself.
5 Demographic Transition and Future Prospects
The demographic transition provides a framework to understand the findings
from the past and helps to evaluate the prospects in the future, driven by
the growth differentials between the clubs. To illustrate, consider the club-
specific average incomes in the beginning and end of the period 1960-2000
(Figure 2) and compare Clubs I and III, for example. Due to the consider-
9To compare our results with earlier works, we performed the unit root tests to the
club 4 of Durlauf and Johnson (1995), as it is a sub-set of our Club III. While they find
that club 4 exhibited unconditional β-convergence at 1960-1985, we find that it also shows
both β- convergence and the convergence in the first generation unit root tests but no
convergence in the second generation unit root test at 1960-2003.
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able differences in the growth rates (0.74% versus 2.49%), the income gap
increased from five to tenfold, this increase being exacerbated by a massive
demographic expansion in the former club (Figure 2). By contrast, the in-
come gap between Clubs III and II decreased from four to two point fivefold
due to rapid growth (3.21%) in the latter.
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Figure 2: The per capita GDP in 1960 (grey bar) and 2003 (black bar).
Population shares indicated above the bars.
The theory of the demographic transition presupposes that countries
move ahead to more mature stages, i.e., the demographic clubs are transi-
tional rather than permanent, and multiple steady states may not be present
in the data (Galor and Weil 2000, Galor 2007). Unfortunately, none of the
techniques above can identify the data generating processes, but the dynam-
ics of the demographic variables can give some hints. Figure 3 shows that the
life expectancy has increased everywhere such that in 2003 its average value
in Club I (Club II) exceeded that in Club II (Club III) in 1960. Analogous
information is given by total fertility, infant mortality, and the by the depen-
dence rate, all of which have much decreased since 1960 as most countries
have reached the higher stages, thus supporting transitional clubs.
This makes some future explorations possible. Consider a new classifica-
tion derived by applying the earlier boundaries of the clubs to the values of
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Figure 3: Demographic indicators in 1960 (grey bar) and 2003 (black bar).
the life expectancies in 2003. This classification shows that only six countries
still stay in Club I and twelve in Club II, while all other countries (67) have
proceeded to Club III.10 One can now predict the average incomes, say, in
2040 illustrated in Figure 4.11 A comparison of Figures 4 and 2 shows that
the future does not replicate the past. On the contrary, while the average
income in Club II approached that in Club III in the period 1960-2003, in
the period 2004-2040 it will fall behind since the inherited low incomes pro-
vide a limited basis regardless of rapid growth (3.21%). Thus, the countries
which have migrated from Club I to Club II will experience a take-off, but
this take-off is only in terms of country’s own history and does not raise its
income closer to the more advanced countries which have already proceeded
too far. Therefore, the catching-up opportunity which was gained by the
countries that arrived Club II in the post-war period is not open for those
10The countries staying in Club I are: Burundi, Cote d‘Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mozam-
bique, Malawi, and Zambia. The countries in Club II are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Chad, Tanzania, and Uganda.
11There are few attempts to predict the evolution of the future incomes, and to our
knowledge, none in a cross-country set-up. Holz (2008), however, extrapolates Chinese
real GDP growth rates past from 1978-2000 to evaluate when the size of Chinese economy
would surpass that of US in absolute terms.
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who will arrive later.
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Figure 4: The per capita GDP in 2003 (grey bar) and 2040 (black bar).
Club III may also experience changes as 29 of its 67 members will be new-
comers. While these new-comers may grow at the rate which was typical of
this club in the past, the old members may meet new growth-hampering
problems, such as ageing, not visible in the period 1960-2003 yet. Hence,
new convergence tendencies may arise within Club III. This, together with
the limited perspectives from Clubs I and II, refers to bi-polarization rather
than convergence of world incomes as a whole. The number of countries in
Clubs I and II, however, has decreased and their population share will be
smaller than earlier (Figure 4).
6 Discussion
This paper explores the role of demographics in the post-war growth and con-
vergence of countries. Differences in the timing of the demographic transition
have segmented countries to the different regimes or clubs and simultaneous
existence of these clubs makes the concept of convergence meaningless if the
existence of such clubs neglected. We evaluate the relevance of demographics
by classifying countries into demographic clubs by the regression tree method.
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The discriminating variable turns out to be life expectancy, probably due to
its role as an indicator of technical diffusion and as a necessary condition for
investment in human capital, classifying countries in tree demographic clubs.
The traditional β-convergence and first generation unit root tests offer
support for convergence in demographic clubs but the second generation unit
root test undermines this result so that the evidence is equivocal. In this way,
our findings are in line with the trends in the literature, where the earlier
tests suggest convergence but the most recent tests show that homogenous
clubs are difficult to uncover even among the OECD countries. The rapid
progress in the field of panel unit root tests may shed further light on this
subject in the future. On the other hand, the demographic transition as a
source of mixed evidence calls for further research efforts because its phase
may differ across countries and controlling for the initial state alone may
not lead to convergence clubs. Hence, a control for the heterogeneity from
the different phases may be necessary, although challenging, as the phase of
transition may be dictated by economic growth itself.
Continuous demographic transition elevates countries to higher clubs,
providing important implications for future incomes. Unfortunately, this
information gives no unequivocal support to convergence of world incomes
as the income gaps have already widened to such an extent that even the
take-offs, typical to the second stage or club, is unable to rise the incomes of
the poor sufficiently. Thus, new economic miracles will hardly arise on the
demographic basis alone. Therefore, economic policies should be targeted to
help the countries which still stay in the lowest clubs. The good news from
the analysis here is that the ever-richer majority of countries face better op-
portunities to manage this task since the number of these countries is small
and their population share is low. An interesting question is, whether the
most efficient policy is to concentrate on health and life-expectancy, as longer
and healthier life should give incentives to save and invest in human capital,
both of which are the impetus of growth.
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A Appendix: Countries and Clubs
Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
Benin 956 41.48 165 6.96 99.49 1345 54.68 105 5.82 88.32
Bolivia 2431 42.65 164 6.63 85.35 3006 64.06 55 3.91 74.30
Burkina F. 768 36.36 197 7.00 76.47 1071 50.81 109 6.33 97.05
Burundi 677 41.29 149 6.80 88.85 763 47.56 106 6.81 91.35
Cameroon 1947 41.52 145 5.90 78.97 2713 49.86 90 4.84 82.82
Chad 1142 40.79 169 6.09 79.30 884 50.50 124 6.51 96.80
Comoros 1354 43.44 154 6.91 90.47 1278 63.21 57 4.83 80.65
Congo 1010 46.69 130 5.99 81.50 1420 53.15 75 4.76 82.22
Cote d‘Iv. 1334 43.67 154 7.31 85.97 2019 46.90 121 5.00 81.47
Egypt 1469 45.74 180 7.07 84.30 4759 70.00 35 3.14 61.72
Ethiopia 400 40.06 160 6.90 89.08 688 50.96 95 5.73 89.93
Gambia 722 32.99 223 6.50 74.64 937 58.18 79 5.12 81.42
Ghana 412 45.62 124 6.90 88.65 1440 58.64 63 4.32 74.34
Guatemala 2494 45.47 127 6.85 93.87 3805 69.11 38 4.55 90.27
Guinea 3072 35.12 201 7.00 83.19 2887 53.92 112 5.81 86.72
Guinea-B. 493 33.99 196 5.99 70.97 584 45.56 120 7.11 101.88
Honduras 1715 46.34 135 7.42 97.14 2291 68.77 31 3.68 79.02
India 892 41.87 140 5.81 76.75 2990 63.07 62 3.08 61.18
Jordan 4151 46.82 110 8.00 94.17 3743 71.41 23 3.49 67.75
Kenya 1179 46.29 117 8.12 100.78 1218 51.32 69 5.00 82.90
Madagascar 1268 39.87 155 6.80 87.14 759 57.54 74 5.24 88.51
Malawi 460 37.80 203 7.00 93.44 771 45.47 100 5.99 100.30
Mali 797 36.13 216 7.11 80.65 1184 52.11 137 6.71 105.49
Morocco 1299 46.68 145 7.15 90.14 4061 69.79 37 2.50 55.06
Mozambique 838 35.01 185 6.50 82.05 1452 43.79 106 5.49 90.19
Nepal 800 38.50 187 6.06 79.22 1441 61.66 63 3.64 74.27
Nicaragua 4428 47.02 131 7.33 100.95 3409 71.07 26 2.97 71.96
Niger 1167 39.08 196 7.90 100.83 834 54.77 118 7.43 104.51
Pakistan 801 46.61 148 6.28 82.70 2593 63.78 75 3.95 69.64
Peru 3129 47.68 136 6.85 87.80 4351 70.09 29 2.67 59.59
Senegal 1776 40.39 186 7.00 82.23 1407 61.78 69 5.17 86.70
Tanzania 502 43.63 136 6.80 93.05 912 49.90 78 5.60 89.99
Togo 833 42.55 159 7.10 88.96 789 57.64 93 5.31 86.37
Uganda 873 43.95 130 6.90 94.27 1113 48.01 83 6.73 107.67
Zambia 910 45.07 127 6.62 90.17 946 39.44 101 5.60 94.69
Club1 1386 41.95 159 6.84 87.24 1882 56.81 79 4.99 83.92
Continued
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Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
Brazil 2644 54.51 109 6.15 87.02 7205 71.18 27 2.33 51.43
Cape Verde 1417 51.98 105 7.00 91.67 5117 70.38 29 3.71 78.03
Dominican R. 2080 51.69 124 7.32 101.67 6904 71.03 34 2.94 64.08
El Salvador 2991 50.42 123 6.85 94.99 4751 70.90 26 2.86 65.55
Korea 1458 54.20 70 5.63 82.72 17597 77.23 5 1.24 39.05
Malaysia 1801 53.92 63 6.72 94.89 12133 73.18 10 2.84 55.63
Philippines 2039 53.20 96 6.85 95.64 3575 70.46 27 3.51 66.61
Syria 837 49.22 119 7.60 98.61 2016 73.19 18 3.42 65.99
Taiwan 1444 54.20 70 5.63 82.72 19885 77.23 5 1.24 39.05
Thailand 1059 54.89 83 6.40 87.39 7274 68.80 12 1.83 41.79
Tunisia 2103 48.34 155 7.25 90.59 7601 73.16 22 2.01 47.72
Turkey 2250 50.26 176 6.19 84.53 5633 70.96 31 2.22 51.23
Club 2 1843 52.24 108 6.63 91.04 8308 72.31 20 2.51 55.51
Argentina 7838 64.88 60 3.09 57.04 10170 74.45 15 2.34 57.77
Australia 10815 70.73 20 3.27 62.77 27872 80.44 5 1.76 48.43
Austria 8444 68.74 32 2.78 51.90 27567 79.03 5 1.38 46.97
Barbados 7039 65.87 61 4.26 81.20 15707 76.09 12 1.50 39.02
Belgium 8070 70.10 27 2.66 55.03 25264 78.36 4 1.64 52.26
Canada 10576 71.07 26 3.61 69.61 27845 79.92 5 1.52 44.43
Chile 5086 56.90 109 5.28 79.45 12141 77.91 8 1.99 49.18
Colombia 2819 56.68 92 6.76 98.11 6094 71.82 20 2.44 54.90
Costa Rica 4513 61.45 81 7.22 98.05 8586 78.21 10 2.26 51.92
Denmark 11438 72.16 20 2.59 55.82 27970 77.42 5 1.76 51.28
Finland 7785 68.52 19 2.58 60.28 23784 78.48 4 1.76 49.90
France 8531 70.48 25 2.85 61.31 25664 79.72 4 1.88 53.14
Greece 4177 68.73 50 2.20 53.24 15785 78.43 8 1.28 48.28
Hong Kong 3322 66.32 33 5.31 77.60 27658 81.60 4 0.94 37.18
Iceland 8380 73.37 17 3.94 74.26 26347 81.06 3 2.00 51.12
Ireland 5294 69.69 28 3.98 73.23 28248 77.88 5 1.97 46.73
Israel 6750 68.70 29 3.85 69.28 20713 79.81 5 2.89 61.34
Italy 7167 69.31 40 2.50 51.69 22925 80.00 5 1.29 50.89
Jamaica 3477 64.28 61 5.64 85.11 4585 72.12 14 2.60 64.36
Japan 4509 67.91 25 2.02 56.12 24037 81.91 3 1.29 50.67
Luxembourg 12920 68.81 29 2.37 47.42 49262 78.22 5 1.67 48.58
Mauritius 3662 59.63 61 5.72 96.35 16464 72.03 15 1.90 44.95
Mexico 3719 56.95 88 6.82 96.98 7938 75.07 20 2.37 57.70
Netherlands 10462 73.24 16 3.17 63.93 26157 78.81 5 1.72 48.28
Continued
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Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
New Zealand 12063 70.92 21 4.02 71.02 22195 79.30 6 1.97 50.64
Norway 9473 73.41 17 2.90 58.73 34011 79.37 4 1.81 52.12
Panama 2499 60.65 63 5.92 89.61 8244 74.81 20 2.69 57.11
Paraguay 2510 63.77 62 6.55 104.30 4716 70.85 35 3.44 68.34
Portugal 3689 63.34 76 3.07 59.08 17334 77.31 5 1.45 48.28
Singapore 4219 64.54 30 4.93 82.79 26999 78.91 3 1.34 38.96
Spain 4881 69.18 42 2.89 55.37 20644 80.09 4 1.30 45.45
Sri Lanka 866 61.97 63 5.50 85.97 4272 71.02 12 2.00 44.22
Sweden 11065 73.11 15 2.32 51.45 26136 80.18 3 1.67 52.99
Switzerland 15253 71.27 20 2.51 50.79 28792 80.82 4 1.41 47.34
Trinidad T 6274 63.52 48 4.99 88.72 18417 69.03 15 1.60 40.16
UK 10323 70.64 22 2.81 53.71 26046 78.57 5 1.71 51.62
USA 12892 69.88 25 3.31 66.72 34875 77.52 7 2.04 49.42
Uruguay 6143 67.71 48 2.90 56.25 8855 75.44 14 2.19 59.55
Club 3 7077 67.06 42 3.92 69.74 20798 77.42 9 1.86 50.41
Full Sample 3995 54.63 100 5.51 79.96 11246 68.21 39 3.24 64.93
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